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Appellant hereby submits the following notice of errors in her
opening brief previously

filed.

Appellant requests that this

errata be attached to Appellant's main brief, sufficient copies
have been provided for that purpose.

A copy is also attached as

Appendix I to Appellant's Reply Brief.
ERRATA TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF
1.

The cover erroneously identifies the Appellant's Brief as

the "Brief of Appellee."
2.

In the Table of Contents, under the heading "Summary of

Arguments, sub heading, "I", line 5 should readf ". . .undisputed
PIP benefits from
3.

Archuleta's own. . ."

Page 6, line 2, "[R. at 961-965]" should be corrected to

read "[R. at 692 1f3] ."
4.

Page 6, line 5 of Paragraph 3f "[R. at 1176-78]" should

read "[R. at 1176, R. at 694 1114-19]."
5.

Page 6f line 2 of Paragraph 4 f "[R. at 969]" should read

"[R. at 695 and 969] ."
6.

Page 6, line 3 of Paragraph 4, "[R. at 1178]" should read

"[R. at 695] ."
7.

Page 7 f line 3 of Paragraph 6, "[R. at 85-86]" should

read "[R. at 695-697]."
8.

Page 7, lines 6 & 7 of Paragraph 7, "[R. at 53]" should

read "[R. at 693 119-11; 694 1112 & 13; 697 1J44; 698 1146-51]."
9.

Page 7, line 4 of Paragraph 8, "[R. at 1076]" should read

"[R. at 693 119-11; R. at 694 1fl2 & 13, 1075 & 1076]."
10.

Page

testimony."

7, line

6 of

Paragraph

8, add

"uncontroverted

11.

Page 7, line 3 of Paragraph 9, add "and [R. at 694 1113]."

12.

Page 8, line 2 of Paragraph 10, add "and [R. at 693

1111]."
13.

Page 8, line 2 of Paragraph 15, "[R. at 523-34, 690]"

should read "[R. at 523-25, 690]."
14.

Page 18, line 5 of the first full Paragraph, add after

the quote, "[R. at 970 lines 1-3]."
DATED this c^kt

day of October, 1996.
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Plaintiff and Appellant Maxine Archuleta ("Archuleta")
hereby submits, pursuant to Rules 24 and 26 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, her opening brief with respect to the
Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
entered on January 23, 1996, the Order Denying Plaintiff's
Motion to Compel Discovery entered on December 5, 1995, and
the Judgment of Non-Suit entered on January 24, 1996 by the
Second Judicial District Court for Weber County.
JURISDICTION OP THE COURT OP APPEALS
This is an appeal of right taken from a Judgment of NonSuit and final orders denying Archuleta's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Motion to Compel.
motions were filed by either party.

No post-judgment
The final Judgment

appealed from was entered on January 24, 1996.
filed

a timely

Notice of Appeal

on February

Archuleta
21, 1996.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) has been "poured
over" to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing

Archuleta's

Motion

for Partial

Summary

Judgment

to grant
because

Defendant and Appellee Donald C. Hughes ("Hughes") was not
entitled to collect legal fees for services not covered by his
written fee agreement where the fee agreement did not provide
for the settlement of medical bills or collecting undisputed
PIP benefits?
1

(a)

Standard of review; The trial court's decision to

grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is a question of
law, which is reviewed for correctness.
County. 855 P.2d

231, 235

Higgins v. Salt Lake

(Utah 1993); State Farm Fire &

Casualty co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah App. 1994).
(b)

Issue preserved

for appeal:

Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment filed by Archuleta, [R. at 738]; Order on
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [R. at 690].
2.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

refusing

to

grant

Archuleta's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because Hughes
was

precluded

by

applicable

ethical

rules

from

charging

Archuleta a contingent fee for the routine collection of PIP
insurance benefits from her own insurer?
(a)

Standard of review:

Higgins v. Salt Lake County,

855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire & Casualty co.
v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah App. 1994).
(b)

Issue

preserved

for

appeal: Motion

for

Partial

Summary Judgment filed by Archuleta, [R. at 738]; Plaintiffs
Supplemental Brief Re: Construction of Attorney Fee Agreement,
[R. at 477]; Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment [R. at 690].
3.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

refusing

to

grant

Archuleta's Motion to Compel Discovery with regard to bank
account information relating to Hughes' handling of certain

2

funds belonging to Archuleta, which information had a bearing
on Archuleta's fraud and malpractice claims?
(a)

Standard of review; Decisions regarding pre-trial

discovery are committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court, e.g.,

Utah Dept. of Transportation v, Oscruthorpe, 892

P.2d 4,6 (Utah 1995); Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 515
(Utah App. 1996).

The wrongful denial of requested discovery,

however, is presumed to be prejudicial rather than harmless,
because the aggrieved party has been denied access to the
requested information and cannot be required to proved that
the information that has been denied would have affected the
outcome of the trial.

Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258 (Utah

Ct. App. 1994).
(b)
Discovery

Issue

preserved

for

appeal:

Motion

to

[R. at 272]; Order on Several Motions

Compel
(Denying

Motion to Compel) at f 8 [R. at 523-24].
4.

Did

Archuleta's

the

trial

proffered

court
jury

err

in

instruction

refusing
holding

to

give

Hughes

responsible for the acts of his agent who dealt with Archuleta
on Hughes 7 behalf?
(a)

Standard of review: A trial court's refusal to give

a requested jury instruction is an issue of law, reviewed for
correctness.

Onglnt'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850

P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993).
(b)

Issue preserved for appeal;
3

[R. at 1052-60]

5.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

refusing

to

grant

Archuleta's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because Hughes
constructively defrauded Archuleta by charging her an illegal
and unreasonable contingent fee for collecting undisputed PIP
benefits.
(a)

Standard of review:

Higctins v. Salt Lake County,

855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire & Casualty co.
v. Gearv, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah App. 1994).
(b)

Issue preserved

for appeal;

Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment filed by Archuleta, [R. at 738]; Order on
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

[R. at 690]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a legal malpractice case arising out of the
representation and handling of a personal injury claim by
Hughes.

In particular, the case involves the interpretation

and application of an "Attorney Retainer Contract" that was
entered into by Archuleta and Hughes' representative, Ronald
Bennett. Hughes, acting almost entirely through his adjuster,
Bennett, settled Archuleta's case and charged her a contingent
fee of one-third of the total amount recovered —

including

$2400 in PIP benefits that were undisputed and which she would
have

been

entitled

to

upon

submission

to

her

insurer.

Archuleta's claims against Hughes arise out of his

handling

of her claim, including his retaining the contingent fee from
the PIP benefits due from Archuleta's insurer.
4

Archuleta moved for Partial Summary Judgment on the
grounds that the written fee agreement between Archuleta and
Hughes did not provide for the collection of contingent fees
for the collection of PIP benefits and because charging a
contingent fee to collect such benefits is illegal. Archuleta
further moved for Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that
Hughes' conduct constituted, as a matter of law, constructive
fraud.

Archuleta also moved to compel discovery of certain

bank records relating to Hughes' handling of settlement funds
belonging to Archuleta, as these records had a direct bearing
on Archuleta's claims for malpractice and fraud. At the jury
trial held on Archuleta's claims, Archuleta requested that the
jury be instructed that Hughes could be held liable for the
acts or omissions of his agent, Bennett.

Archuleta appeals

from the denial of these motions and the refusal to give the
requested jury instruction as to Hughes' liability for the
acts of his agent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Less than a week after her auto accident injury,

Archuleta was contacted by Ronald Bennett, a non-lawyer who
worked

as

a

"public

adjuster."1

!

Bennett

offered

to

In Utah State Bar v. Sumerhays & Hayden Public
Adjusters, 905 P. 2d 867 (Utah, 1995) , the Utah Supreme Court
held that representation of parties by public adjusters
constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court upheld a permanent injunction against public
adjusting.
5

"represent" her in seeking compensation from the responsible
party.

[R. at 961-65]

2.

When Archuleta met with Bennett in his office at the

back of a store, she signed an Attorney Retainer Agreement
which designated Donald Hughes, the defendant-appellee here,
as her attorney.
3.

[R. at 967-68]

Hughes, who resided in St. Louis at that time,

admitted he was not present when the retainer was signed, that
the blank contract spaces were probably completed by Bennett,
and that he never personally met Archuleta, but claimed he
recalled talking to her twice on the phone.
4.

Hughes

never

corresponded

with

[R. at 1176-78]
his

"client,''

Archuleta, [R. at 969] and indeed did not even retain her
phone number in his legal file.

[R. at 1178] Neither Hughes

nor Bennett explained to Archuleta the difference between
liability payments from the other parties' insurer and PIP
benefits from her own insurer.
5.

The

"Attorney

[R. at 970]

Retainer

Agreement"

signed

by

Archuleta was ambiguous regarding contingent compensation
terms, and did not provide attorney fees for collecting
undisputed

insurance

benefits due under Archuleta's own

insurance policy from her insurer.

(A copy of the Attorney

Retainer Agreement is attached hereto as Attachment "A.")
6.
Louis.

Hughes "handled" Archuleta's case entirely from St.
He did not obtain medical information about her
6

condition. Instead, Hughes authorized Bennett to initiate and
conduct

settlement

discussions

(in

which

participate) with the insurance company•
7.

he

did

not

[R. at 85-86]

Bennett accepted the insurance company's first offer

of $6,500.00 with the proviso that unpaid medical expenses of
$2,400 be included

in the settlement rather than being

submitted for payment under the plaintiff's PIP policy and
then reimbursed by the liability carrier.

Archuleta was not

told that the settlement included unpaid PIP benefits. [R. at
53]
8.

Thus,

the

gross

settlement

payment

of

$9,186

included $2,400 for the balance of medical bills which would
have been reimbursable as personal injury protection (PIP)
benefits under Archuleta's own insurance policy2 [R. at 1076],
but had not been submitted to the insurer
direction).
9.

(at Bennett's

[R. at 981]

Hughes has admitted that the $2400 of unpaid medical

expenses would have been paid by Archuleta's PIP insurance if
the bills had been submitted.
10.

[R. at 1063-64]

Despite this, Hughes took a full one-third fee of

$800 on the $2400 included in the settlement for the medical

2

Both the other driver and Archuleta were insured by the
same insurance company, Allstate, and thus the total
settlement received by Archuleta related to both proceeds from
her "own" insurance policy as well as that of the other
driver.
7

expenses that would have been paid under Archuleta's PIP
coverage.

[R. at 1075-76]

11.

In addition, Hughes retained $1186 from Archuleta's

share of the settlement, ostensibly to pay pending hospital
bills, even though his retainer agreement did not retain him
to settle her bills.
12.

[R. at 1103]

This $1,186 was returned to Archuleta after she

dismissed plaintiff and retained another attorney.

[R. at

1105] Hughes never resolved the outstanding medical bills or
contacted the hospital to do so.
13.

[R. at 1110]

Archuleta moved for partial summary judgment on the

grounds that as a matter of law Hughes was not entitled to
collect

a

contingent

fee

on

the

$2400 portion

of the

settlement that would have been payable to her under her own
PIP benefits.
14.
relating

[R. at 738]

Archuleta also moved to compel discovery responses
to her

discovery

requests

relating

to Hughes'

handling of the $1186 that he had held in his account for the
payment of medical bills.
15.

Both the summary judgment and the motion to compel

discovery were denied.
16.

[R. at 272]

[R. at 523-34, 690]

A jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of

Hughes on Archuleta's claims that Hughes was guilty of legal
malpractice.

[R. at 688]

8

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS
1.

Hughes collected a one-third contingency fee for

certain PIP insurance benefits obtained from Archuleta's own
insurer rather than the tortfeasor who injured her.

The

written contingent fee agreement drafted by Hughes and signed
by Archuleta must be construed strictly against Hughes.

It

does not allow Hughes to recover for settlement of medial
bills or collection of undisputed PIP benefits.
2.

Because there is virtually no risk of non-recovery

in collection of PIP insurance benefits, the Utah State Bar
and other courts and bar associations have determined that it
is unethical to charge "contingent" fees for the collection of
routine PIP insurance benefits. Hughes' collection of fees on
Archuleta's PIP benefits was therefore prohibited.
3.

Virtually

all

of

the

"work"

done

to

settle

Archuleta's case was performed by a "public adjuster," Ron
Bennett, who was acting on behalf of Hughes. Utah agency law
holds principals liable for the acts of their agents acting
within the scope of their agency.

It was therefore error for

the trial court to refuse to give a jury instruction that
Hughes was responsible for the acts and omissions of his agent
—

Bennett.

This error was

compounded

by the Court's

statement: "Mr. Bennett is not on trial here."
4.

[R. at 970]

Archuleta sought discovery of bank records relating

to Hughes' handling of certain settlement funds owed to her.
9

Hughes resisted this request on the fallacious grounds that
these records were "privileged."

Archuleta sought to compel

production of this information, which motion was denied. The
erroneous denial of discovery information is presumed to be
prejudicial as the party requesting the information does not
have the information to show whether it would have affected
the outcome of the trial.
5.

Because of his status as her attorney, Hughes is, as

a matter

of

Archuleta.

law,

in a confidential

relationship with

His abuse of that relationship by failing to

disclose that his charging of contingent fees for collection
of

PIP

benefits,

which

were

excessive

and

ethically

prohibited, constituted constructive fraud on Archuleta.
ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court erred in denying Archuleta's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment as Hughes' retainer
agreement was ambiguous and did not retain him to
settle medical bills or collect undisputed PIP
benefits Archuleta's own insurer.

The written "Attorney Retainer Agreement" pursuant to
which Hughes was hired by Archuleta to represent her is a
single-page, pre-printed "form" document with blanks that have
been "filled-in" in handwriting.

The document is less than

one full page in length and is set forth in its entirety as
Attachment

tt

A." In describing the work to be completed by

Hughes and the compensation for doing this work, the Agreement
provides:
10

In consideration of the legal services to be
rendered by Attorney Donald C. Hughes, hereinafter
referred to as Attorney, for any claim that Maxine
Archuleta, hereinafter referred to as Client, may
have against the party or parties responsible for
injuries and damages sustained by Client on or
about the 15 [sic] day of October 1993 arising from
a certain occurrence in [illegible] County, State
of Utah, briefly described as follows: auto
collision.
Client hereby authorizes Attorney to commence
and prosecuted said claim and assigns to Attorney a
lien of 1/3 (1/3%) [sic] of all amounts recovered
by compromise, settlement or judgment obtained
after trial or within 10 days of the date set for
trial.
It is understood by Client that this
agreement extends only through preparation and
trial of the claim, and not to the defense or
prosecution of any appeal that may be required.
IF NO RECOVERY IS OBTAINED, NO FEE SHALL BE PAYABLE
TO ATTORNEY.
Attachment "A" at 1.
Under established

case law in Utah, contingent fee

agreements are to be "strictly construed against one who is
'both

the

attorney

draftsman

of

and

a

party

to

the

instrument.'" Phillips v. Smith, 768 P. 2d 449, 451 (Utah 1989)
quoting

Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bvbee, 306 P.2d 773,

775 (Utah 1957) . In Phillips the Utah Supreme Court held that
because
regarding

a

written
the

contingent

client's

fee

liability

agreement
if

was

silent

representation

was

terminated prior to the obtaining recovery no fees were owed
by the clients to attorneys who were discharged
settlement.

before

"[T]he express agreement of the parties did not

provide for the possibility that [attorneys'] representation
11

of the [clients] would be terminated before the [clients']
claim

was

settled.

Therefore

the

[clients]

owed

the

[attorneys] nothing when they terminated that representation."
Phillips, 768 P.2d at 452.
The written Attorney Retainer Agreement prepared by
Hughes and executed by Archuleta is hopelessly ambiguous.
Read literally, it provides for payment to Hughes of a
percentage of settlement amounts "obtained after trial or
within 10 days of the date set for trial." Because there was
no date set for trial and no trial of Archuleta's claims,
under the rationale of Phillips no compensation was due to
Hughes.

Moreover, the written agreement is ambiguous as to

the amount of compensation owing.

The agreement calls for a

"lien" of "1/3 (1/3%) of all amounts recovered." If this were
strictly construed against Hughes, he would be entitled to
.0033 of the amount recovered for Archuleta.
Even if it is possible to "gloss over" the problems
inherent in the drafting of the Agreement, it simply does not
provide for any fees to Hughes for settling Archuleta's
medical bills or her claims against her own insurance company.
Under

long-established

ethical

rules,

contingent

agreements in Utah are required to be in writing.
1.5(c) Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.

fee

See Rule

The Retainer

Agreement signed by Archuleta allows Hughes to pursue claims
Archuleta "may have against the party or parties responsible
12

for injuries and damages sustained by Archuleta . . . ."

No

mention is made of pursuing claims against her insurer.

No

mention is made of retaining Hughes to settle her medical
bills.

In the absence of a clear written statement that

Hughes was to pursue such claims, there was no basis for him
to collect contingent fees from Archuleta on the basis of
settling her PIP claims against her own insurer.
The Utah State Bar's fee arbitration panel has ruled that
a retainer agreement similar to the one used by Hughes in this
case was improper and limited the attorney to recovering the
reasonable value of his services.

See Utah Bar Journal.

January 1994, p. 23 (Copy attached hereto as Attachment "B")
In that case, the tortfeasor had been uninsured, so an
attorney filed a personal injury claim against his client's
own insurance company, collecting $100,000 under the policy's
uninsured motorist provisions, retaining one-third of this
recovery as his fee. While the client's right to recovery
stemmed from the same accident and injuries for which she had
initially retained her attorney, the fee was found to be
improper because the representation contract did not provide
a fee for recovering from the client's own insurance company.
The attorney was admonished for charging an excessive fee and
restricted to recovering only the reasonable value of services
he had rendered.

13

The representation agreement in this case must similarly
be construed strictly against Hughes, who provided the form to
his client. It imply does not provide a fee for settling
medical bills or collecting benefits under Archuleta7s own
contract of insurance. Because Hughes would not be allowed an
$800 fee for recovering $2,400 in PIP benefits if he had
directly submitted the medical expenses to Archuleta's own PIP
carrier, he cannot be allowed to claim that fee by including
this $2,400 into the liability settlement.
Archuleta moved for partial summary judgment against
Hughes on the issue of his fees with respect to her PIP
benefits. Summary judgment should be granted when no genuine
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
Financial

Institutions,

782

E.g.,

P.2d

Gillman
506

(Utah

v. Dept. of
1989).

The

undisputed material facts establish that even though Hughes'
retainer agreement did not allow attorney fees for settling
PIP claims with Archuleta's own insurer, he charged Archuleta
a one-third contingency fee of $8 00 on insurance settlement
funds for medical bills that her insurer would have paid to
Archuleta as PIP benefits if they had been submitted.
these

facts, Archuleta

was

entitled

to partial

On

summary

judgment as to $800 of the fee charged by Hughes as a matter
of law.

This Court should reverse the trial court's refusal

to grant summary judgment on this issue.
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II.

The trial court erred in not granting Archuleta's
Motion for Partial Summary judgment as Utah ethical
rules prohibit charging contingent fees for the
routine collection of PIP insurance benefits.

It is undisputed that Hughes received $800 of contingent
fees

from

the

settlement

funds

paid

to Archuleta

that

represented one-third of the $2400 PIP insurance benefits she
was to receive from her own insurer, Allstate.

Charging

contingent fees for the collection of PIP insurance benefits
is unethical and prohibited in Utah. Opinion 114 of the Utah
State Bar's Ethic's Advisory Opinion Committee, which was
issued on February 20, 1992, flatly prohibits the use of a
one-third contingency fee for collection of PIP benefits from
a client's insurer.

The full opinion of the Committee is as

follows:
Under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct,
which require that a lawyer's fee be reasonable,
contingent fees charged for the routine filing and
collection of undisputed PIP or "no fault" claims
from the client's insurer are unreasonable and
excessive.
State bars, courts, and commentators
facing this issue uniformly agree that contingent
fees charged on the recovery of undisputed PIP
payments are unreasonable.
Contingent fees are
generally higher [than fixed fees] because receipt
of the
fee itself
is contingent on some
possibility.
Because PIP benefits are virtually
guaranteed to accident victims a fee continent on
the receipt of those benefits is likely to be
unreasonable.
(emphasis added)

Accordingly, the Utah Bar advised Utah

attorneys that Rule 1.5(a)3 would be violated by charging a
3

Which requires that lawyer's fees be reasonable.
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contingent fee for the filing and collection of PIP or 'no
fault' claims from the client's insurer.
The reasonableness of a contingent fee contract depends
in part on the "realistic risk of non-recovery." Id. Since
there is "virtually no risk" and minimal time involved for the
lawyer, contingent fees are improper for the collection of PIP
benefits.

Id. This same conclusion has been reached in

numerous other jurisdictions. See, e.gr,, Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672 (Md. 1985); Pops & Estrin, P.C.
v. Reliance Insurance Co. , 562 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1990); In re Hannaf 362 S.E.2d 632 (S.C. 1987); and Brickman,
Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark? 37 UCLA L. Rev. 29, 76-78 (1989).
Hughes defended his fee in this case by asserting that
Archuleta was obligated to introduce expert testimony that he
had violated the "standard of care" expected of an attorney in
Weber County, Utah.

This is incorrect.

The prohibition

against levying contingent fees for collecting undisputed PIP
benefits has nothing to do with a "standard of care." Courts
and bar associations have the inherent authority to regulate
attorney fee agreements. Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449,453
(Utah 1989) ("The awarding and approving of attorney's fees is
subject to the inherent power of a court to regulate the
professional conduct of attorneys.") When a fee agreement is
prohibited by such regulation, the offending provision is
16

unenforceable as a matter of law.

Allowing Hughes to retain

the $800 fee for settling Archuleta's PIP claims would defeat
the established policy of the Utah State Bar and established
precedent relating to the interpretation and enforcement of
contingent

fee

contracts.

As

enforced

by

Hughes, his

Agreement on this point was illegal and void.

The trial

court's denial of Archuleta's Motion for Summary Judgment on
this point should be reversed.
III. The trial court erred in refusing Archuleta's
proffered jury instruction on Hughes' responsibility for the acts of his agent.
It is undisputed that the actual handling of Archuleta's
claim

was

accomplished—

with

some

direction by Hughes from St. Louis —

claimed

by Ronald Bennett,

acting in the capacity of "public adjuster."
who solicited Archuleta as a client.

contact and

It was Bennett

It was Bennett who

"filled out" the "form" Retainer Agreement with Archuleta. It
was Bennett who did not investigate the claim. It was Bennett
who

contacted

the

insurance

settlement agreement.

company

and

negotiated

the

In all of these actions, Bennett was

acting on behalf of his principal, Hughes. Bennett is not an
attorney. He has no authority to practice law or to prosecute
claims on behalf of another in court.
Hughes

were

Bennett's

acts

Only as an agent for

permissible.

As

Bennett's

principal, Hughes is inescapably responsible for Bennett's
failure to thoroughly investigate Archuleta's case and his
17

negotiation

of

an

inappropriate

and

illegal

settlement

agreement.
At trial, Hughes attempted to distance himself from
Bennett's actions, Indeed, the theme of his defense was: "I
am not Bennett." This technique was, in one sense, effective.
Indeed, even the trial judge at one point stated that "Bennett
is not on trial here." While Bennett was not on trial, he had
acted as Hughes' agent throughout his handling of Archuleta's
claim and his actions on behalf of Hughes were on trial
because they were attributable — as a matter of law — to his
principal, Hughes.

"It is well established in the law that a

principal is liable for the acts of his agent within the scope
of

the

principal

agent's
is

authority,

disclosed

irrespective

or

of

undisclosed."

whether

the

Garland

Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992); see also

v.

Phillips

v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 881 (Utah 1983).
Notwithstanding

the

undisputed

facts

demonstrating

Bennett's relationship with Hughes, as outlined above, the
trial court refused to give a MUJI jury instruction on the
"liability of a principal for the acts of agents."

This

prejudice of this error was compounded by Hughes' repeated
statements in his defense that "he was not Bennett" and
implicitly that he should not be identified with or held
responsible for

Bennett's acts.
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A trial

court's refusal to

issue a proffered

jury

instruction presents a question of law for which no deference
is granted to the trial court's conclusion. Ona International
v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993).

The

erroneous omission of a jury instruction requires a new trial
if the error was prejudicial. Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d
1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (failure to instruct that minor
engaged in adult activity held to same standard of care as
adult was prejudicial error, even though another instruction
defined general standard of care, where opposing counsel and
expert repeatedly referred to mitigating effect of defendant's
youth and inexperience).

Because Hughes' statements in his

defense put the relationship and responsibility of Hughes for
Bennett's acts squarely at issue, the refusal to give the jury
instruction

on

vicarious

liability

of

principals

was

prejudicial error requiring reversal and a new trial.
IV.

The trial court erred when it refused to compel
Hughes' production of certain credit union account
records which could have produced evidence of both
fraud and malpractice.

Archuleta

sought

through

written

discovery

and

subsequently through a Motion to Compel Discovery information
regarding the $1,186 that was withheld from the proceeds of
her settlement for a period of several months. Specifically,
Archuleta requested that Hughes produce:
[C]opies of all statements from that account [i.e.
Hughes' Trust Account] for all times that any money
19

was held for plaintiff7s benefit (i.e. from the
date of settlement to the time the final $1,185 was
paid to the plaintiff.)
Defendant7s

Response

Plaintiff7s

to

Third

Set

of

Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Request for
Production of Documents, (copy attached as Attachment "C").
Hughes7 Response to this Request was as follows:
Defendant objects to this request. This request is
unduly burdensome, harassing and not calculated to
lead to the admission of admissible evidence. The
information sought is privileged.
Id. Archuleta moved to compel production of the trust account
information.

The trial court denied Archuleta7s motion to

compel.
Archuleta

was certainly

entitled

to

obtain through

discovery copies of the bank statements for the account in
which her money had been held. The account was at a credit
union and appears to be a interest bearing account.

It is

unethical for Hughes to earn interest on money held in trust
for Archuleta. He must account to her for interest earned and
pay it over to her.4

Moreover, Archuleta is entitled to

verify that the money was in the trust account during the
4

Rule 1.15(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
requires that :
[A] lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or
third person any funds or other property that the
client or third person is entitled to receive and
upon request by the client or third person, shall
promptly render a full accounting regarding such
property. (emphasis added).
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period of time it was held by the Hughes.

There was some

evidence that Hughes 7 spouse, a non-attorney, may have been a
signatory on the account in which Archuleta's funds were held.
This too would have been a violation of Hughes' ethical duties
to Archuleta.

Hughes opposed production of records for the

account on the grounds that the bank statements contained
privileged

information

concerning

assertion is untenable on its face.

his

clients.

Such

an

Bank records simply to

not contain or reflect client names or other

identifying

information.
In Askew v. Hardman. 884 P.2d 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
the Utah Court of Appeals set forth the principal that the
erroneous denial of a discovery request is presumed to be
prejudicial error and that the burden of justifying the denial
of discovery is on the party resisting discovery:
However, the usual harmless-error analysis is
inapposite where the trial court has erroneously
denied a discovery request.
In such situations,
this court is required to presume prejudice unless
it is shown that the denial was harmless. Weahkee
v. Norton. 621 F.2d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir. 1980);
accord
Shaklee Corp. v. Gunnell, 748 F.2d 548, 550
(10th Cir. 1984). Prejudice is presumed because to
require the requesting party to show that the error
was harmful would place the requesting party in the
untenable position of having to demonstrate that
the contents of inaccessible information would have
affected the outcome of the case.
Because the
requesting party does not have the information, he
or she will never be able to demonstrate that the
trial court's erroneous denial of a discovery
request was anything but harmless. The burden of
demonstrating that the erroneous denial of a
discovery
reguest
was
not
prejudicial
must
21

therefore rest with the party resisting discovery.
See In re California Public Utilities Comm'n, 892
F.2d 778, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1989). Where we cannot
determine from the record whether the reguested
documents might have changed the outcome of the
trial, we cannot say that the error was harmless.
Weahkee, 621 F.2d at 1083; Shaklee Corp., 748 F.2d
at 550. Because defendant has not demonstrated
that the denial of plaintiff's discovery request
was not prejudicial, and because we cannot
determine from the record whether the requested
documents would have changed the outcome of the
case, the trial court committed prejudicial error
in denying plaintiff's discovery request.
884 P.2d at 1262-63 (emphasis added).
Under the rationale of Askew, the trial court's denial of
discovery

in

the present

case must

be

presumed

to be

prejudicial. Unless this Court can "determine from the record
whether the requested documents might have changed the outcome
of the trial" the error cannot be held to be harmless. There
is simply no way to determine from the record whether the
requested information might have changed the outcome of the
trial. For this reason, in addition to the foregoing matters,
Archuleta is entitled to a reversal and new trial.
V,

As a matter of law, Hughes constructively defrauded
Archuleta when he charged her an Illegal and unreasonable contingent fee for collecting undisputed
PIP benefits.

Under well-established precedent in Utah, an attorneyclient

relationship

relationship. See, e.g.,

is

a

fiduciary

and

confidential

Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449, 451

(Utah 1989); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah
1985); Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1978).
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This confidential relationship

exists as matter of law.

Because

Hughes

he

was

her

attorney,

had

a

confidential

relationship with Archuleta.
It

is

also

well-established

confidential

relationship

can

constructive

fraud

the

where

give

that
rise

dominant

this
to

a

party

type

of

claim

for

(i.e.

the

attorney) breaches a duty owed to the other party, even though
no intent to defraud existed.

As stated in Blodgett v.

Martsch,
If the circumstances are such that the [ a
party ] could exercise extraordinary influence over
the [other ] and the defendant was or should have
been aware the plaintiff reposed
trust and
confidence in the defendant and reasonably relied
on defendants guidance, then the parties are said
to be in "confidential relationship" and the
plaintiff's burden is considerably diminished. A
course of dealing between persons so situated is
watched with extreme jealousy and solicitude, and
if there is found the slightest trace of undue
influence or unfair advantage, redress will be
given to the injured party.
. . . . There are a few relationships (such as
parent-child,
attorney-client,
trustee-cestui)
which the law presumes to be confidential.
590 P.2d at 302 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
In Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985), it was
held

that

if:

(1) a

transaction

between

parties

to

a

confidential relationship (2) benefits the dominant party in
whom trust was reposed and (3) causes actual damage to the
other party, then the dominant party has the burden of proving
the transaction was in fact fair and not unduly influenced or
23

fraudulent; otherwise, the transaction will be set aside.
Courts in other jurisdictions have held found constructive
fraud based on the attorney-client relationship where an
attorney

collected

an excessive

fee and then failed to

renegotiate that fee when it was discovered that his client's
right to the money was not being challenged. E.g.f

In re

Gerard, 548 N.E.2d 1051 (111. 1989).
As Archuleta's attorney, Hughes was in a confidential
relationship with her.

He entered into a fee contract with

her which he used to collect a contingency fee forbidden by
ethical rules, breaching his duty to disclose there was little
or no risk involved in collecting her PIP benefits.

This

transaction benefitted him financially, and damaged Archuleta
in the amount of $800.

These facts establish constructive

fraud, and summary judgment should have been entered for
Archuleta as a matter of law because Hughes failed to meet his
burden of showing that the $800 contingent fee was in fact
fair and not the result of fraud or undue influence. See Von
Hake, 705 P. 2d at 769.

As with the other matters discussed

herein this error was prejudicial and warrants the reversal of
the judgment entered in favor of Hughes.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing cases and authorities,
Appellant Maxine Archuleta respectfully requests that this
Court reverse and, as appropriate, remand this matter for
24

further proceedings consistent with the established Utah
precedent upon which she relies.
Dated this

1^

day of July, 1996.

KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

By: <

^

^

fo^

Mark E. Wilkey
Attorneys for Appellant—
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
On the V\
day of July, 1996, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was served via United States mail, first
class postage prepaid on the following:
Donald C. Hughes, Esq.
Attorney Pro Se
P.O. Box 27611
St. Louis, MO 63146
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ATTACHMENT "A
Attorney Retainer Agreement

reasonable requests made of him by Allorncy in connection with the preparation
and prosecution of this case.
If Attorney is discharged before conclusion of the case, client agrees
to pay an allorncy fee of S90.00 per hour for time spent on this case, plus cosls
incurred.
Client hereby authorizes Allorncy lo release any and all hospilal
records, to the parties responsible for client's injuries, or their attorneys and
insurance companies when deemed necessary by Attorney to obtain a recovery.

ATTORNEY RETAINER AGREEMENT
In consideration of the legal services to be rendered by Attorney
Donald C. Hughes, hereinafter referred lo as Attorney, for any claims that
hereinafter rcfencd to as Client, may have agaiust Ihc
parly or parties responsible for injuries and damages sustained by Client ou or
about the f *"i day of (*(' * . 19 fe> arising from a certain occurrence in
.!_ /*L \f. County, Stale of ('.- 7£/ . briefly described as follows:
!

t " -'V

-'**-- (W(**") ct •

•

Client hereby authorizes Attorney to commence and prosecute said
claim and assigns to Attorney a lien of V ^ ,
( x/', %) of all amounts
recovered by compromise, settlement or judgment obtained after trial or within
10 days of the date set for trial. It is understood by Client that this agreement
extends only through preparation and trial of the claim, and not to the defense
or prosecution of any appeal thai may be required.
IF NO RECOVERY IS OBTAINED, NO FEE SHALL BE
PAYABLE TO ATTORNEY.
The parlies to this agreement further agree as follows:

Attorney agrees to prosecute client's claim with reasonable diligence
and vigor.
Client grants Attorney a lien on his claim for Attorney's fees and cosls
and authorizes Attorney to retain his fee and cosls from any amount recovered
by compromise, judgement or otherwise.
Client acknowledges that any claim such as the one involved in this
case is by its nature unpredictable and that Attorney has made no representation
as to what amount, if any, client may be entitled lo recover.

All expenses of investigation, preparation, and suil including doctors
reports, reports of olhcr experts, witness fees, filing fees and other court costs
shall be paid as follows: k I
/ .
I l l

/\di'iu\t'c( ly -•-rrir./rva
Any costs or expenses advances by Attorney shall be reimbursed in full
from Clients share of any recovery.
Allorncy retains the right lo employ associate counsel of his choice and
at his expense. Allorncy further retains the right to withdraw from the case for
any reason and at any tunc upon proper notice lo Client.
Client agrees not lo drop the action or withdraw in the absence of
Attorney's express written recommendation lo do so. Client further agrees nol
to negotiate, discuss, or acccpl any settlement of this mailer from any
individual, corporation, Finn or other entity uuless presented to Client by
Attorney.
Client agrees lo keep Altoruey advised of his whereabouts al all tunes
and to coo|x:ralc in the preparation and Irial of Ihc case, to appear upon
reasonable nolice for depositions and court appearances, and lo comply with all

Clienl
NOTE: THIS IS A CONTRACT. It prelects both you and your attorney
and will prevent misunderstandings. Read it carefully. Tlcasc discussed or if
you have any qucslious.

ATTACHMENT "B
See Utah Bar Journal
January 1994, p. 23

Discipline Corner
ADMONITION
An attorney was Admonished for
.-narging an excessive fee in violation of
Rule 1.5(a), FEES of the Rules of Professional . Conduct based upon a
recommendation by a Screening Panel of
the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The
attorney was retained to represent a client
in a personal injury matter involving the
client's son who was struck by an automobile. When it was discovered that the
motorist was uninsured the attorney filed a
claim against the client's own insurance
company and collected policy limits of
S 100.000.00 under the uninsured motorist
portion of the policy. The attorney kept
one-third as a fee. A fee arbitration panel
found this was an improper fee in that the
contingency fee agreement between the
attorney and the client did not include
recovery from the client's own insurance
company. Therefore,-the attorney was
entitled only to the reasonable value of the
services rendered.

Utah State Bar Journal
January 1994, page 23

ATTACHMENT "C"
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Third Set of
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and
Request for Production of Documents

^jrV-;^

Donald Hughes
8816 Manchester Road, #242
St. Louis, MO 63144
Telephone: (314)968-8055
Attorney for Pro Se

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH

MAXINE ARCHULETA,

DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD SET OF
INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST FOR
ADMISSIONS AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD HUGHES,

Judge: Dawson

Defendant

No. 940700264

Comes now the Defendant and answers the discovery request of the Plaintiff as
follows:
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORIES
1. Identify defendant's current employment including the names, address and
phone numbers of all companies, partnerships, firms, entities or other organizations for
which the defendant has done any work at any time during the last 12 months.
Answer: Defendant objects to this interrogatory. This interrogatory is unduly
burdensome, harassing and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The
information is privileged and not relevant nor material to the present case.

Pagel

Response: This request is beyond the scope of discovery and is unduly
burdensome, harassing and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence
and therefore the same is denied.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OP DOCUMENTS
11. Provide complete copies of defendant's tax returns for tax years 1992, 1993
and 1994 including all schedules and attachments.
Response:

Defendant objects to this request. This request is unduly

burdensome, harassing and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The
information is privileged and not relevant nor material to the present case.
12. Provide a summary financial statement to verify the answer to interrogatory
number six.
Response:

Defendant objects to this request. This request is unduly

burdensome, harassing and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The
information is privileged and not relevant nor material to the present case.
13. Produce a copy of the $5,000.00 check paid to the plaintiff from defendant's trust
account.
Response:

Defendant objects to this request. This request is unduly

burdensome, harassing and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The request
is onerous and burdensome and duplicative.
14. Produce copies of all statements from that account for all times that any money
was held for plaintiffs benefit (i.e. from the date of settlement to the time the final
$1,185.00 was paid to the plaintiff).
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Response:

Defendant objects to this request. This request is unduly

burdensome, harassing and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The request
is onerous and burdensome and duplicative. The information sought is privileged.
Dated this ^ ' Day of July, 1995.

Subscribed and sworn this J2JZ d a y of J u , y. 1 " 5 -

Notary Public
Npfc
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